



Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000400030007-2

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DD/A Registry

77-1959/3

DIA review(s) completed.

DD/A Registry

File 08M2-2

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77-4953

U-1129/SP

30 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Management of SAFE/ADISS Projects

1. I have reviewed the Booz-Allen and the SAFE/ADISS Working Group Studies and believe the following proposals embody the best of these efforts with added emphasis toward achieving early commonality.

- a. Management of the ADISS Project be consolidated under the existing SAFE Project Office.
- b. The ADISS Project Manager serve as deputy to the SAFE Project Manager.
- c. On-going and scheduled system definition studies be used to develop an overall system specification converging to a common system design with a single contractor.
- d. Details of project administration, to include funding arrangements, be worked out in a memorandum of understanding.
- e. Project consolidation be effective 1 September 1977 and that the memorandum of understanding be approved within 90 days.

2. I request your concurrence in this approach. In the meantime, I have directed my staff to work with the CIA staff to do the necessary preliminary work on this proposal.

EUGENE F. TIGHE, Jr.  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Acting Director

ODP 1675-77  
22 AUG 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Clifford D. May, Jr.  
Director of Data Processing

STATENMENT SUBJECT : [REDACTED] SAFE/ADISS

1. In anticipation of your participation in the STATIN scheduled 25 August [REDACTED] presentation for the DCI, I have enclosed some reference material for your information. Enclosure 1 is a summary of the B/A presentation prepared by [REDACTED]. Enclosure 2 lists the main findings in the B/A report. Enclosure 3 is a complete set of charts used in the first B/A presentation to Agency and DIA representatives (key charts are tabbed).

2. The significant findings are:

- a. A joint project office would not be effective.
- b. A Coordinating Committee should be established to oversee, coordinate, and control development activities of separate project offices.
- c. A single system is most expensive.
- d. Duplicate systems with partial commonality in application software are least expensive. ✓
- e. Costs will be greater than current budget estimates.

3. We do not believe that the B/A proposed management arrangement is the best way to pursue the project if it is aimed at achieving the most economic alternative (duplicate systems with partial commonality in applications software). Instead, we believe that a joint project office, as described in the CIA/DIA-developed SAFE/ADISS Joint Management Plan, is the best way. We understand that this Plan will soon be sent to the DCI [REDACTED]. Under this Plan, a CIA/DIA jointly manned project office would pursue the SAFE development

STATINTL

as the vehicle for the duplicate systems to be employed by both CIA and DIA. ADIIS requirements would be folded into the SAFE development as they become available from the DIA studies. Aside from this one major point of disagreement, we are generally in agreement with the B/A findings.

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4. If either you or the Acting DDCI would like Mr. [redacted] to walk you through the B/A charts in advance of the meeting, please let me know.

[redacted] STATINTL

Clifford D. May, Jr.



Att: a/s

Distribution:

Orig + 1 w/1 cpy att.

STATINTL This is a summary of the [redacted] SAFE/ADISS Commonality Study

STAT [redacted] team over a sixty day period. STAT

1. This study was contracted to examine all aspects of commonality between the CIA's SAFE System and the DIA's ADIIS. These aspects of commonality include requirements, functions, organization, cost, and operation. The study consisted of an examination of documents and interviews of personnel by [redacted]

2. Summary of findings:

- a. The two Agencies should pursue coordinated programs, develop identical hardware/utility software configurations to be installed separately in each Agency. Applications software should be separate but coordinated.
- b. Each organization should focus on the unique aspects of its mission and a separate and new resource management group should be developed on an equal status with the projects in each Agency to ensure coordination. This new group would provide system engineering; control the quality assurance and test and evaluation activities; oversee the data base activities and control the funding for the two projects.
- c. The proposed organization chart is enclosed showing only one project office which would be replicated for the other Agency.

3. Relative Status:

- a. Neither system has developed an "A" specification. The SAFE activity is one to two years ahead of the ADIIS in requirements and program planning (rather than in actual development.) It is noted that while the SAFE System is dedicated fundamentally to support analysts in their every day work, the major function of the ADIIS System is information storage and retrieval. SAFE is more supported by precedent research and development and experience with the pilot SAFE effort. It also has a highly

focused management effort and considerable detailed planning. The function requirements have not to date been reconciled with the new budget. Some of the requirements appear excessive. ADISS on the other hand is driven by the current limitation of the DIAOLS System which was implemented in the GE Machine Code and has evolved in a patch-work fashion to the point of saturation of its capabilities. DIAOLS also does not support the analysts in the sense that SAFE is intended and the interface to the rest of DODIIS is at present not well defined. An additional need was surfaced within DIA for an ADSTAR-like capability which has not yet been addressed as an ADISS requirement.

4. Security:

- a. A need for multi-level security within the system was discussed but not resolved. It is not clearly understood what security exists within the DIAOLS System at the present time. It is not clear what type of security within the system will be adequate within the environment. This could become an overriding factor with reference to system commonality.

5. Common Elements:

- a. It is felt the following developments have high potential for commonality:
  1. Systems level hardware and its configuration. It is felt that both systems could use the same computer processors and standard peripherals along with concentrators and controllers.
  2. Operating systems software;
  3. The utilitarian software functions of message handling, text search and command language were also identified as common development candidates.

- b. It was felt that the applications software should be unique to the organization as it related more to the particular mission functions of the Agencies.
- c. Other significant differences are as follows - ADISS focuses on large structured master files while SAFE/ADSTAR focused on analyst support using catalog files, message handling and analysis and data collection and correlation. Further ADISS must interface with DODIIS and U and S Commands while the SAFE is primarily contained within the analyst community.

6. Two hypothetical systems of \$75 million cost each were analyzed for saving as a result of several modes of coordination. These modes are: a) totally separate systems with no coordination, b) duplicate systems but with separate development, c) duplicate systems with partial commonality and d) a single hardware software configuration to satisfy both. Compared with separate costs of \$150 million, the minimum cost plan was for a duplicate system of hardware and operating software system with partial commonality of application software of \$114 million and maximum cost of a single system to satisfy both at a cost of \$171 million. It should be noted that all of these costs are relative and not meant to be representative of the estimated system cost. The principal areas of savings and of expansion of costs in these alternatives was in the operating software, application software and test and evaluation.

7. Management and Organization - Booz-Allen felt that a single project office was not appropriate for the following reasons:

- a. Reduced productivity - the complex task of satisfying problems would be faced at each design step. Furthermore, basic policy issues would be created throughout the design process. The paper work and time consumed in resolving these issues was felt to be a major factor in delaying the system IOC.
- b. Hazy fiscal environment. It was felt that there would be a loss of clear accountability and concern over the value each Agency was

receiving for the money spent.

- c. Loss of Project Management control. It was felt that the priorities of the Agencies, the schedule of developments of the system, the performance requirements for various sub-systems would all be pulling in conflicting directions with the Project requiring extensive third party involvement to resolve conflicts.
- d. There would be a hazard of unsatisfactory user utility as a result of compromise resolution of problems.

8. The organization relationship is shown in the attached chart. The JRMO would control the expenditure of funds by both projects, would do the systems engineering trade-offs required, and would exercise coordination control over the data bases administrators and QA functions.

9. A data base administrator was discussed at some length. The data base "Czar" would be responsible for the structure and content of master files and would provide guidance for construction and use for private files.

10. Implementation of a SAFE/ADISS Program - The following actions were recommended to begin immediately.

- a. Each project should have deputy project managers assigned from the other Agency.
- b. The JRMO should run specification reviews for both projects.
- c. There should be a joint SAFE/ADISS architecture study with the results being incorporated in the SAFE A specifications.
- d. There should be a joint data base czar under the JRMO from the DIA with a CIA deputy
- e. DIA should develop a separate DODIIS plan with a specification available prior to the SAFE/ADISS B specifications.

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11. The [redacted] estimates of cost are: SAFE \$50 million; ADISS \$85 million; and ADSTAR \$15 million if commonality is not considered. With the commonality recommended program - SAFE \$45 million; ADISS \$55 million and ADSTAR \$15 million.

Summary: SAFE/ADISS Systems Study

Findings

- a) Pursue a coordinated program through separate projects - coordinated by a separate (new) office.
- b) Establish "Resource Management" group on equal basis with projects to coordinate common effort.
- c) A joint project office would not be effective. *disagree*
- d) Use identical hardware and system software in separate systems.
- e) Develop common application software separately coordinated through JRMO.
- f) Exploiting commonality can save 25% over separate developments.
- g) One system for two agencies would cost 15% more than separate options and 50% more than separate systems optimizing commonality.
- h) SAFE is one to two years further into definition and development than ADISS.
- i) A system architecture should be developed and approved early to satisfy both needs.
- j) SAFE should reduce requirements for text search, word processing and number of terminals. Should add annotations capability to ADSTAR.
- k) The two systems have similar architectural and operational implications.
- l) There are significant differences.

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# **RESULTS OF THE SAFE/ADISS COMMONALITY STUDY**

**AUGUST 1977**

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DDA Registry

File 0 + M 2 - 2

DDA 77-4379

2 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Blake  
Acting Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence

FROM: Michael J. Malanick  
Acting Deputy Director for Administration

STATINTL SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Study of SAFE/ADISS

Jack:

The verbal report on the [REDACTED] study of SAFE/ADISS STATINTL commonality is scheduled to be presented at 1000 hours on Monday, 8 August 1977, in the DDI Conference Room (7E-32). Please let me know if you and/or the Director will be attending. If another time would be more convenient, we can arrange a separate report.

*1/2 Mike*

Michael J. Malanick

ADDA/MJMalanick:lm (2 Aug 77)

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1 - ER

1 - DDA Subject  
1 - DDA Chrono  
1 - MJM Chrono

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[Redacted] Executive Registry  
77-1954/1

DDA 77-4379

2 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Blake  
Acting Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence

FROM: Michael J. Malanick  
Acting Deputy Director for Administration

STATINTL SUBJECT: [Redacted] Study of SAFE/ADISS

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[Redacted] STATINTL

[Redacted]  
Michael J. Malanick

DD/A Registry  
71-4367

DD/A Registry  
File QFM 2-2

ODP 1518-77  
1 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for  
Administration

FROM : Clifford D. May, Jr.  
Director of Data Processing

STATINTL SUBJECT : [REDACTED] Study of SAFE/ADISS

Mike:


The verbal report on the [REDACTED] study of  
SAFE/ADISS commonality is scheduled to be presented  
at 1000 hours on 8 August 1977 in the DDI conference  
room, 7E-32. I have been asked to suggest that you  
advise the Acting DDCI and the DCI of this and  
extend an invitation to them to attend. We can  
arrange a separate report for them if that would  
be more convenient.

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STATINTL

[REDACTED]  
Clifford D. May, Jr.

cc: DDI  
D/OCR  
C/SPS/ODP



ODP-1517-77  
SAF-EO89-77  
1 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List

STATINTL

FROM : [redacted]  
Chief, Special Projects Staff, ODP

SUBJECT : SAFE/ADISS Commonality Study

STATINTL

1. On 8 August 1977 at 1000 hours in Room 7E32, CIA Headquarters, [redacted] Applied Research Study team will present the final briefing of its findings resulting from its SAFE/ADISS Commonality Study.

2. This study has been conducted during the past two months to provide an independent assessment of the potential for common development of the SAFE and ADISS Systems. The objectives of this study were to:

- o Identify areas and the degree of commonality between SAFE and ADISS.
- o Develop the advantages to be derived from achieving this commonality.
- o Recommend management and technical procedures which can be applied in implementing the commonality objectives.

3. If you will advise me who will attend from your organization, I will ensure that space is available. I have taken the liberty of copying those who are involved in this study who are probable attendees. If clearances have not been forwarded to CIA Security Office, please have your security officer forward Secret clearances with SI and TK Security Accesses to that office to my attention.

4. If you require further information on this meeting, please call me.

[redacted]

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Booz-Allen Study COTR  
351-2665

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DD/A Registry  
77-4282

ODP 1486-77  
28 July 1977

DD/A Registry  
File OTM 2-2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Clifford D. May, Jr.  
Director of Data Processing

SUBJECT : SAFE/ADISS Joint Project Office

REFERENCE : Memo fm D/ODP to A/DDA dtd 19 Jul 77, same  
subject (ODP 1424-77, DD/A 77-4123)

1. This is in response to your question regarding  
the DIA revision of the draft study on above subject.

2. Contrary to the initial senior-level DIA reaction  
to the draft study paper, DIA has chosen to not significantly  
change the original draft. We are now working with them on  
their suggested changes, none of which are basically ob-  
jectionable to us. Basically, they want to go through a  
one year transitional phase before setting up the joint  
project office. This would consist of establishing a joint  
coordinating committee that would serve as an interface  
between the two agencies while their requirements are being  
pinned down more precisely. We have doubts whether this  
interim step will be acceptable to the DCI, but we don't  
object to it. A senior steering or policy committee (DDI-  
level) would be established at once to oversee the coordi-  
nating committee and the eventual joint project office.

3. We see no problem in meeting the 2 August deadline  
for forwarding a working-level agreed paper to the IC Staff.  
However, we are still concerned that no senior-level CIA  
agreement has been obtained on this paper. I hope this is  
resolved at the scheduled SAFE Steering Group meeting. The  
DDI apparently feels that the SAFE funding problem probably  
means the end of the program - so why worry about a joint pro-  
ject office. I do not share these views. SAFE and ADISS have

had so much visibility in Congress, OMB, PRC, ICS, and even in the President's office, that I do not think it can be turned off that easily. If we allow it to wither on the vine at this stage, I believe it will be interpreted as a move to avoid a joint project.



Clifford D. May, Jr.

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DD/A Registry  
77-4123ODP 1424-77  
19 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM : Clifford D. May, Jr.  
Director of Data Processing  
SUBJECT : SAFE/ADISS Joint Project Office

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1. Attached for your information is a report on the study of the establishment of a SAFE/ADISS joint project office prepared by a CIA/DIA task force headed by [redacted] DD/OCR. [redacted] was our representative on the task force. This study stemmed from certain IC Staff recommendations to the DCI which were approved by him.

2. The attached study proposes a jointly manned (CIA and DIA people) project office sitting in CIA for house-keeping and reporting to the DDI. The staff would be formed from the SAFE group in CIA and the ADISS group in DIA. All funds for the joint project would be in CIA's budget. A senior steering committee, consisting of the DDI, the Director of DIA, and the DDCI/IC, would oversee the project.

3. Presently, this draft study report has run into opposition in the form of a new Admiral in DIA. He is having the paper revised to examine about seven alternatives. We are waiting for the DIA paper before taking the next step.

4. I have some basic problems with this paper, but I am standing down until I see the DIA revisions. Basically, my objections are twofold:

a. I think that the joint project office should confine its interests to policy matters, planning what should be done and who should do it, and tasking the organizations that actually manage the contractors who are developing hardware and software. I think the joint project office should not manage contractors because it will be too busy dealing with policy and pie-slicing issues.

b. I do not think that ODP should be cut out of the picture because we have the best Agency knowhow in managing the development and implementation of large hardware/software systems.

5. If you have any guidance on these issues, I would appreciate your comments. As visualized by D/OCR and DD/OCR, ODP and DDA would be cut out of any project-related role in CIA. Considering the heartburn that SAFE has given us, this might not be a bad idea. But, if we are to be the Agency's central ADP organization, it does not make sense to leave us out. I believe that the joint project office should decide what part of the development work CIA should do and what part DIA should do. ODP would be the implementing office in CIA to carry out tasks levied on CIA by the joint project office.

6. Finally, the schedule for completing this study is rather tight. It should be in final by 26 July. It should be submitted to the IC Staff - presumably with CIA and DIA concurrence - on 2 August. On 8 August the [redacted] report STATINTL is due, and the IC Staff will determine whether anything in the [redacted] report is at variance with the recommendations in this study. On 18 August the study will go to the DCI.

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Clifford D. May, Jr.

Att: a/s

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DRAFT

STAFF STUDY

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A. How to establish a joint project office for CIA's SAFE and DIA's ADISS systems. The objective of any joint project office will be to maximize savings through common development and procurement while at the same time satisfying both CIA and DIA users' requirements.

B. This staff study outlines an organizational structure to meet these objectives and discusses management control, staffing, budgetary and fiscal, and general housekeeping procedures. The study also addresses the handling of CIA/DIA requirements, the system design and development approach and major milestones. The implications of such an organization on the two separate systems are also briefly discussed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. CIA's Safe System

1. In 1972, the DCI approved the initiation of a set of tasks directed toward providing CIA's analysts with the most "effective mix" of central files and special purpose files. Preliminary work with the various CIA analytical offices identified a strong requirement for a series of computer-driven functions that would enable an analyst to view his daily mail on-line, to route items to other offices or individuals, to build and query special analytical files and to have direct on-line access to full-text intelligence message files, a centralized index, and other Community and commercial data bases. Using these requirements, an Office of Central Reference (OCR) project team defined, built and tested a pilot system with many of these capabilities and implemented it in four branches in CIA production offices. Results from this test were reported on in late 1974 and reviewed by the DCI and an independent task team of industry and academic specialists. Based on these findings, the DCI approved development of an Agency-wide SAFE system. The original test system continues on a slightly expanded basis as the "SAFE Interim System." After the SAFE system go ahead was approved by the DCI, briefings on its concepts and the Interim System were provided to Intelligence Community and DoD personnel.

2. During 1975-76 requirements were formalized with heavy user participation and a project team was formed to develop and implement the system for the Directorate of Intelligence in CIA's Office of Data Processing (ODP). Initial SAFE funding was approved for FY 1977.

3. The objective of SAFE is to provide CIA's Directorate of Intelligence analysts with the direct support of data processing technology in order to make the intelligence product better and more timely and to enable these personnel to handle a workload growing in both volume and complexity. The system will do this by providing a series of computer functions for disseminating, scanning, searching, filing, routing, and analyzing information stored in machine and microform storage and for composing and editing finished intelligence at an individual analyst's workstation.

4. CIA currently has study and support contracts outstanding and proposals in-house for a design competition phase.

B. DIA's ADIIS System

1. DIA's ADIIS effort has evolved from several separate DIA information system planning efforts--in particular, DIAOLS which has been operational since 1969. ADIIS will replace DIAOLS, support distributed intelligence production, provide general-purpose data base functions, interconnect to other DoD and non-DoD systems and support analysts and consumers world-wide.

2. ADIIS' purpose is to rationalize the entire DIA information system environment by providing a unified system to meet all DIA's information handling needs through the next decade. ADIIS' objective is to provide a cost effective integration of DIA subsystems.

3. DIA is currently selecting a contractor for the ADIIS System Definition Study.

C. Commonality Question

1. The Congressional Conference Report on the FY 1977 budget for the two agencies recommended coordinated SAFE/ADIIS developmental efforts to achieve "maximum commonality" and hence cost savings. In response to this Congressional directive, project officers from the two systems met initially in October 1976 and arranged for briefings and an exchange of system documentation to determine the real potential of any cost savings. These meetings continued throughout the remainder of 1976 and into 1977 as the two agencies worked on identifying areas that were common to the two systems. Since both projects were in their initial stages, only general areas of potential savings were identified. An interim management plan was completed in February 1977 and revised in May 1977. The plan provides for joint CIA/DIA participation in procurement and joint identification of common developmental modules. The plan, however, is based on the concept of two distinct project offices managing two separate, but related, systems.

2. On 8 April 1977, the DCI requested D/DCI/IC to develop a simple statement of the specific differences in the requirements of SAFE and ADIIS and to formulate a plan for merging the two systems into one. In responding to this requirement, the D/DCI/IC on 25 May 1977 recommended:

- a. DIA complete its ADIIS System Definition Study originally scheduled for September 1978 but a 1 January 1978 date was recommended.
- b. CIA continue its SAFE Design and Analysis Studies but defer any SAFE-peculiar hardware/software acquisition until a configuration option is made.
- c. An independent contractor be retained to make a thorough appraisal of SAFE and ADIIS current documentation.
- d. A DCI SAFE/ADIIS Working Group be established to ensure that CIA and DIA are moving ahead on common concepts, to prepare a staff study on how to establish a joint project office, to monitor the external contractor for the DCI and to establish SAFE/ADIIS Project Formal Review Milestones.

The DCI approved these recommendations on 9 June 1977.

D. Contractual SAFE/ADIIS Commonality Study

1. On 8 June 1977 a contract was awarded to Booz-Allen Applied Research to assess the commonality of the SAFE and ADIIS systems. This study is to (a) identify the areas and degree of commonality between the SAFE and ADIIS systems, (b) develop the advantages to be derived from achieving this commonality, and (c) recommend management and technical procedures to be applied in implementing commonality objectives.

2. The contract provides for an oral presentation of the findings within 60 days (8 August) and a final written report within 90 days (8 September).

E. SAFE/ADIIS Working Group

1. On 23 June 1977 under the chairmanship of the IC Staff, a SAFE/ADIIS Working Group of CIA, DIA and NSA was established to prepare a staff study on how to establish a joint ADIIS/SAFE project office.

### III. DISCUSSION

#### A. Management Options

1. There are numerous management options that could be utilized to create a joint project office. Most of these options, however, are variations on three basic concepts: executive agent; a jointly staffed office similar to but not necessarily the same as the current NPIC; or an IC Staff office.

2. In determining the criteria that should be present within the best organizational structure, we opted for those that would provide clear and clean lines of authority and strong overall direction. We felt that this was critical because the daily problems that surface in any major system development will be complicated by many additional ones that will arise in designing a system(s) to serve two or more agencies. Any organizational structure involving multiple reporting, direction and command channels will have extreme difficulty in controlling the contractor(s), testing the system and phasing the system into service.

3. We considered, but discarded a management structure in which one agency of the Intelligence Community would act as the executive agent for the Project. Under any combination based on this concept, we felt there would be communication problems and considerable adjudication and review requirements. There would be no opportunity for dual agency employee participation in the project but most importantly the user requirements of the outside agencies could be diminished or distorted resulting in a system that did not meet user requirements. The outside agencies because they did not participate in system development could claim the resultant system was not a Community system but one merely developed by the executive agent.

4. We also considered, but discarded, a DCI/IC Staff office structure charged with developing the SAFE/ADISS system perhaps as the beginning of a new Community office that would eventually extend its jurisdiction to all Community ADP and telecommunications management and planning. We felt that this approach would be too costly in new staffing and other overhead requirements, too great a risk to an analytical support system to have its original development under the control of a new organization, too great a risk also to the user requirements within both agencies because such an organization would quickly become remote from the "real analytical world" and lastly there would be no dual agency participation.

5. The management structure that meets most of our criteria and one that offers, we feel, the greatest success for developing and implementing a SAFE/ADISS system is a structure jointly staffed by the two agencies but located within, subject to, and using the administrative facilities of one of the two agencies. This staff study describes how such a joint project office could be formed and how it would operate. It does not cover all the administrative details and specifications of such a structure. These would be developed jointly with the two agencies by the manager selected to head the joint project office.

B. Organization of Joint Project Office

1. A joint project office could be created by a memorandum of understanding between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This memorandum would spell out the objectives of the office; staffing, budgetary and fiscal arrangements; and how the system would be developed within the project structure. The memorandum would locate the office in CIA for "rations and quarters" and would make the Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) responsible for the overall direction of the project. The project office Chief would be either a senior CIA or DIA official and his deputy would be from the opposite agency. Supervisory positions in subordinate organizations within the project office would be shared equally by DIA and CIA employees. The chief and deputy chief of the joint project office would be selected by the DDI and the Director, DIA with the approval of the DCI.

2. Staffing--The project office staff could be created from the current CIA/SAFE staffs in OCR and ODP and the DIA/ADISS current and planned staff. We estimate [redacted] positions shared by STATINTL the two agencies would be required for staffing the project office. The number, however, may increase or decrease dependent upon the responsibilities of the project office as defined in the memorandum of understanding. Most of the staffing details would be spelled out in this memorandum of understanding. The following general guidelines are recommended:

a. DIA personnel would be assigned on a non-reimbursable basis; CIA, however, would pay all official travel, training, and related expenses in connection with the assignment.

b. Personnel assigned to the project office, other than contract personnel and consultants, would be acquired from within each agency. Outside hires would be authorized only after each agency has certified that no qualified personnel are available.

c. Contract personnel would be hired in accordance with CIA regulations and procedures.

d. The chief and deputy chief of the project office would decide the suitability of the individuals nominated by each agency for the project and could request a replacement if an individual is not performing.


e. Performance appraisals would be prepared by the appropriate project office supervisor. Copies of the appraisal forms on DIA employees will be forwarded to DIA as would all training completed certificates and similar documents.

f. Generally, personnel and security regulations of CIA would be followed but these could be modified in negotiation with DIA.

3. Management and Control--The ADIIS/SAFE development would be carried out as a joint project. The system would be defined, designed, developed, and brought to operation under the Joint Analytical Support Project Office (JASPO). JASPO would receive overall direction from CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) but the DDI would work closely on all activities of the joint development effort with the Director, DIA and the DDCI/IC. These three senior individuals would constitute the JASPO Steering Committee, chaired by the DDI. Status and work direction would be reviewed periodically by the JASPO Steering Committee and all final requirements and external specifications at the system level would be approved by the Steering Committee. These approved requirements and specifications would then constitute the mutual agreement on the system to be developed. A proposed JASPO organization chart is given in figure 1.

4. Budget and Fiscal--With the exception of the salaries paid by DIA for its employees detailed to JASPO, all funds for the joint project development would be included in the ODDI/CIA budget. The Chief of JASPO would be responsible for preparing the budget and budgetary justifications; budgetary and fiscal review would be done by the Steering Committee. ODDI/CIA would budget for the CIA staff personnel assigned to JASPO; DIA/RCC would budget for the DIA staff personnel assigned to JASPO. Contracts would be let in accordance with CIA procedures and regulations and would be reported both as elements of task cost and as individual line items. The approval authority for fund expenditures would be the DDI. Authorized FY 1978 funds for ADIIS would be transferred to ODDI/CIA and merged with the SAFE FY 1978 funds to consolidate the FY 1978 budget. A revised FY 1979 Funding Program would be prepared by JASPO for submission to OMB and Congress.

Figure 1: Proposed Organizational Structure for JASPO



5. Housekeeping--CIA would furnish space, furniture, communications, and other administrative support for JASPO. JASPO would utilize CIA procurement channels and be subject to CIA fiscal controls and authority. The first requirement of the Chief, JASPO would be to prepare a detailed Project Management Plan for approval of the JASPO Steering Committee. This plan would cover, but not necessarily be limited to, the management approach, organization, fiscal, contract, study methodology, reviews and reporting, relationships with industry, etc.

#### C. DIA and CIA User Requirements

1. SAFE and ADISS were both conceived with extensive user participation in identifying the analytical support requirements that each system was to provide. It is essential that the thrust of these requirements are preserved and met in any system developed by JASPO. If JASPO fails in this important role, the resultant system would be of little value to the analyst. Furthermore, any fiscal savings resulting from joint development would be of no consequence because the system would not be utilized by the analysts and the caliber of overall intelligence production would suffer. The users in both agencies must, therefore, be well represented in any joint development.

2. JASPO must be sensitive to the user requirements of both agencies. Since some tradeoffs will be necessary in any joint development, it is essential that JASPO develop procedures to ensure that users are consulted regularly and that they have a responsive appeal route whenever design changes are made for reasons of feasibility or cost. Since it will be inevitable that some requirements of both agencies may not be met in certain tradeoff situations, the appeal/reclama procedures in any joint development effort must be clear and efficient. These procedures should be explicitly spelled out in the JASPO management plan. JASPO may want to consider forming an adhoc interagency user council to work with its requirements staff to ensure timely and judicious processing of major design tradeoffs. An interagency user council would be an effective device for ensuring that users' views are heard. Their input could be footnoted to formally record the decision impact for the JASPO Steering Committee.

3. To ensure that the user requirements represent that agency, all user requirements would have to be validated by that agency. Conflicting requirements that emerge from the design specification efforts for which no accommodation could be made within the feasibility or cost threshold would be reviewed (by the adhoc user council) before the requirements are referred for final action to the JASPO Steering Committee.

4. A consolidated record of unsatisfied requirements would be maintained by JASPO and published on a regular basis (for the interagency user council). This procedure would ensure that system users are notified, far in advance, of system limitations and are able to adjust appropriately.

5. When user requirements of either agency conflict on procedural or interface standards, the affected agency would prepare the waiver request. Major deviations from DoD or CIA interface standards would be approved by the JASPO Steering Committee prior to waiver action and implementation. A typical example might be a Defense Standard requiring the utilization of standard telecommunications protocols throughout DoD digital communications networks. A waiver of this standard for a DIA analytical support system would be approved by the JASPO Steering Committee prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense for final decision.

6. CIA currently has quantified requirements for its SAFE system approved and well documented in the SAFE Functional Requirements Document (SAF-D001D/77).

7. DIA currently has specified requirements plus a set of general requirements. For example, there is a requirement to replace DIAOLS with a system providing a greater capacity (specified) but there are also requirements to address the information processing needs of DIA (general). Both of these types are outlined in DIA's ADISS Plan dated 10 June 1977.

8. Both SAFE and ADISS are directed toward the objective of providing information handling capabilities to CIA analysts and to DIA analysts and consumers. The joint system to be designed by JASPO cannot serve alone as a Community information handling system without radically changing the original purposes of SAFE and ADISS and adding substantial costs to the joint system. The analytical support system that would be developed by the joint office, however, could serve as one of the elements of a Community-wide system yet to be defined and developed.

#### D. System Design and Development

1. Under a joint development effort, JASPO would be responsible for consolidating characteristics and needs of the joint system and would contract for its design and development. JASPO would monitor the contract, conduct in-progress reviews, develop testing and reliability programs, verify the system architecture, and conduct final government acceptance tests for both agencies. The joint office would then be phased out as the system's final operational capability is achieved in CIA and DIA.

2. Some consideration might be given to maintaining JASPO as a permanent project office for the two agencies to handle the analytical support system's enhancements or modifications. This provision, however, should be spelled out in the memorandum of understanding and the joint management plan.

3. Phased development of the joint system appears to be the best approach, that is, elements can be brought to service as developed rather than as one large delivery and cut-over. This phased development would permit orderly transition by function. It would require, however, a modular design to ensure manageable sizing of developmental tasks.

4. The ultimate supporting hardware configuration may be physically centralized serving both agencies or distributed dependent upon functional requirements, costs, and operational considerations. Some interface to other Community systems will be necessary and this should be spelled out in greater detail in the final specifications. If the system is to meet its primary objective of supporting production analysts, interfaces must be generalized and should provide both security and loading protection in accordance with the type of analytical file, the data and security restrictions.

5. Documentation would follow a common standard. JASPO would review and evaluate DoD and CIA standards and select one for all analysis and design documentation.

6. Contract deliverables will be reviewed by JASPO and within each agency (and by the adhoc interagency council) when verification or validation is required by the user constituency.

#### E. Status of On-Going Programs

1. The ADIIS System Definition Study scheduled to be awarded in August 1977 and the SAFE Design Competition contract award scheduled for September 1977 should continue as planned during the formation of JASPO. After JASPO is created, it would assume the responsibility for both contractual efforts and, if required, would make the necessary contractual modifications for joint project development. These two contracts for analysis and design will focus upon the commonality issue. The DIA contract will be managed by DIA personnel who will be assigned to JASPO. CIA membership on this DIA team should be provided as the initial step of the joint staff merger. In a similar manner, a DIA employee from the ADIIS technical staff will be on the team managing the CIA design competition. Any subsequent contractual efforts before JASPO is formed would consist of combined DIA and CIA personnel reflecting

the joint development. Under this arrangement, both ADIIS and SAFE goals can be pursued (within the joint development mode) but without any interruption while the memorandum of understanding and the joint management and logistical plans are completed and JASPO activated. Continuing these contracts as scheduled also prevents a one year delay that would occur by the re-initiation of the procurement phase for both contracts.

2. In the interim period before JASPO is established, CIA and DIA personnel will continue their participation in each agency's source selection and project review processes as outlined in the interim joint management plan agreed to by the two agencies (SAF-A002A/77, 1 June 1977).

#### F. Major Milestones

Award DIA ADIIS Study Definition Contract	August 1977
Award CIA Design Competition Contract	September 1977
IC Staff Initiate Preparation and Negotiations of JASPO Memorandum of Understanding	1 September 1977
Complete JASPO Memorandum of Understanding	1 November 1977
Establish JASPO Planning Staff	15 November 1977
Complete Management and Logistical Plans for the Project (JASPO Planning Staff)*	15 January 1978
Consolidate ADIIS/PMO and SAFE/PMO into JASPO	1 February 1978

\*Project Milestones would be established in the Joint Management Plan.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. It is possible to create a joint project office for CIA's SAFE and DIA's ADIIS systems by a memorandum of understanding between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

B. There are several management options for a project office. A jointly staffed office located in one of the two agencies for "rations and quarters" is the soundest of all the available options for combined project management. Any joint ADIIS/SAFE system could be defined, designed, developed and brought into operation by this joint project management office.

C. Major concerns with this proposed organizational structure are:

1. One agency might be in a position to exert more influence over the project than the other.
2. The combined project office would be confronted with more complex technical and management problems than those confronted by individual project offices located in each agency.
3. A joint project office would be more remote from the users for whom the SAFE and ADIIS systems are being developed. It will require an intensive effort by the joint project office and by the two agencies to ensure that these user requirements are not distorted.
4. A joint project development will encounter significant technical problems resulting from DoD-wide interface requirements incumbent upon ADIIS.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. It is recommended that a Joint Analytical Support Project Office (JASPO) be established within CIA by a memorandum of understanding signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI; JASPO to be staffed by personnel from both agencies and charged with defining, designing, developing and bringing to operational readiness a joint analytical support system for CIA and DIA analysts embodying SAFE and ADIIS concepts. It is further recommended that:

1. JASPO be under the direct supervision of CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence and all funds for the joint project development, except for the salaries of DIA employees assigned to JASPO, be assigned to the O/DDI/CIA budget.
2. The chief and deputy chief of JASPO be selected by the Director, DIA and Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA with the approval of the DCI and that they both not be from the same agency.
3. The staff for JASPO be created from the current CIA/SAFE staff and the DIA/ADIIS current and planned staff.
4. Oversight of the joint project development be exercised by a JASPO Steering Committee comprised of CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Director of DIA and the D/DCI/IC. The Steering Committee to be chaired by the DDI.

5. CIA furnish space, furniture, communications and all other administrative support for JASPO. JASPO to be authorized to utilize CIA procurement channels and be subject to CIA fiscal controls and authority.

6. The current work being contracted on SAFE and ADIIS be continued as scheduled and combined into JASPO when it is formed.

B. The above recommendations be implemented in accordance with the proposed milestones presented in Section III, F of this staff study.

APPROVED:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE:

DD/A Registry

Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000400030007-2

DD/A Registry

77-4202

File

ODP 1453-77

22 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM : Clifford D. May, Jr.  
Director of Data Processing  
SUBJECT : CIA Position on Joint SAFE/ADISS Project Office  
REFERENCE : ODP memo to A/DDA dtd 19 July 77, subject:  
SAFE/ADISS Joint Project Office (ODP 1424-77)

Much:

1. We have now received the DIA revision of the Joint SAFE/ADISS Project Office plan I referred to in the reference and we are trying to resolve the differences that still exist with DIA. Unfortunately, nothing is being done to reach agreement in CIA on what we would like to see in the Joint Project Office and where we think it should reside organizationally in CIA. The Chairman of the joint panel that drafted the original plan, [redacted] is on leave. STATINTL [redacted] ODP, is attempting to keep the dialogue going with DIA because there is no one else to do it. [redacted] STATINTL has had a copy of the first draft for over a week, without comment. I do not know where you and Jack might stand on the issue of transferring SAFE project responsibility and people to the DDI, as proposed in the plan. And - most important - time is running out.

2. I believe we need to get responsible people from CIA together, review the plan, resolve any internal CIA issues, and give our representatives guidance on what the CIA will accept in the Joint Project Office. [redacted] is the self-appointed Chairman of the SAFE Steering Committee (consisting of the DDA, DDS&T, and Comptroller) which probably is the best-suited mechanism for addressing this problem. I recommend that we propose to Stevens (by phone or correspondence) that the SAFE Steering Committee be convened as soon as possible to consider the draft plan for a Joint Project Office and to resolve any internal CIA issues related thereto.

STATINTL

STATINTL

Clifford D. May, Jr.

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let's go this route  
26 JUL 1977

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